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Summary
The two main types of skew models, transactional and compromise models, make different assumptions about the division of reproduction. Transactional models assume that one individual has full control over reproduction within the group, but may have to refrain from claiming all reproduction in order to prevent others leaving or evicting it from the group. Compromise models, by contrast, ignore outside options such as departing to breed elsewhere, but allow for incomplete control over reproduction within the group. Attempts to synthesize these two approaches have proved controversial. Here, we show that this controversy can be resolved using a simple principle from the economic literature on bargaining -the "outside option principle." Even if outside options are available, they will influence the outcome of reproductive conflict within a group only if they yield greater payoffs than are available within the group. We present a novel synthetic model based on this principle, in which individuals engage in a tug-of-war over reproduction within a group, but may "ease off " in their competitive effort in response to the threat of departure or eviction. We show that over a large range of parameter space, particularly when group productivity and relatedness among group members are high, these threats are not credible, so that opportunities outside the group do not influence the stable level of skew. However, when group productivity and relatedness are low, one or other of the players will typically ease off in competition in order to maintain group stability. Under these circumstances, outside
Introduction
The term reproductive skew refers to inequality in the distribution of breeding success among members of a group (Vehrencamp 1983 , Keller & Reeve 1994 . In high-skew societies, such as those of honeybees (Apis mellifera), Mexican jays (Aphelocoma ultramarina), or meerkats (Suricata suricatta), the distribution of reproductive opportunities is markedly unequal (see, e.g., Chapter 13 in this volume). One or a few breeders monopolize reproduction, while others are denied the opportunity to mate or to raise offspring (and may even, in the case of eusocial insects or naked mole-rats (Heterocephalus glaber), develop as sterile workers). In low-skew societies, by contrast, all individuals have similar opportunities to breed (see, e.g., Chapter 15).
Inequality in breeding success is not a precisely defined concept. There are many different plausible ways in which to conceive and measure inequality in a multi-member group, leading to many different indices of skew (Kokko & Lindströ m 1997 , Tsuji & Kasuya 2001 . Moreover, inequality in actual reproductive success may be expected to arise simply by chance, even if all individuals have similar opportunities to breed (e.g. Haydock & Koenig 2002) . Nevertheless, however one chooses to measure inequality, it is clear that there are dramatic and consistent differences in skew within and among species (Keller & Reeve 1994 , Reeve & Keller 2001 . Even closely related species otherwise similar in their ecology and behavior may differ markedly in this respect -compare, for instance, dwarf mongooses (Helogale parvula), in which typically only one female in a group breeds, with banded mongooses (Mungos mungo), in which most females breed in each attempt (Cant 2000) . These differences in reproductive skew cry out for explanation.
Models of reproductive skew attempt to provide an adaptive account of variation in skew both between and within species. They assume that there exists a conflict of interest among members of a group, such that each would benefit by obtaining a greater share of reproduction than is in the best interest of the others. Each model then predicts how (at evolutionary equilibrium) this conflict of interest will be resolved, depending upon various factors such as the benefits of group membership, the opportunity for independent breeding, and the ability of each group member to compete for resources or breeding opportunities, as well as to evict or exclude others from the group (Reeve & Ratnieks 1993 , Keller & Reeve 1994 , Johnstone 2000 .
Models of skew may differ in their assumptions about the extent of conflict between group members (e.g. Cant & Johnstone [1999] suggested that when production of offspring entails accelerating costs, individuals might all benefit from sharing reproductive opportunities). Most, however, are distinguished by their assumptions about the relative power of dominant and subordinate individuals. The most striking contrast in this respect is between transactional and compromise models of skew.
Transactional models of skew
Transactional models of skew were the first to be developed. Vehrencamp's (1979 Vehrencamp's ( , 1983 seminal papers, in which she introduced the concept of reproductive skew, were built around a transactional model, and it is this approach that has been followed in most later analyses (e.g. Reeve & Ratnieks 1993 , Johnstone & Cant 1999 , Buston et al. 2007 . In fact, when biologists talk of skew theory it is usually the transactional approach that they have in mind. The basic assumption of transactional models is that animals may concede reproductive opportunities to others, despite being potentially able to claim these opportunities for themselves, in order to maintain the stability of the group. This is advantageous because cooperation is presumed to yield productivity benefits. It may therefore pay to yield some reproduction to others in order to gain (or continue to enjoy) the benefits of associating with them.
There are in fact two types of transactional model. Early analyses focused on reproductive concessions offered by dominants to retain helpful subordinates in the group -in these models, dominance takes the form of complete control over reproduction, with dominant individuals yielding breeding opportunities to subordinates so as to make it worth their while remaining in the group rather than departing (Vehrencamp 1979 , 1983 , Reeve & Ratnieks 1993 , Reeve & Emlen 2000 . By contrast with this notion of "concessions," the "restraint" model focuses on reproductive concessions offered by subordinates to prevent the dominant evicting them -in these models, dominance takes the form of control over group membership, with subordinates refraining from claiming as large a share of reproduction as they might, lest the dominant eject them from the group (Clutton-Brock 1998 , Johnstone & Cant 1999 .
Both types of model can be formalised in a similar way (Reeve & Ratnieks 1993 , Johnstone & Cant 1999 , Johnstone 2000 , Buston et al. 2007 . Consider a pair of individuals, related by a coefficient r. In association, the combined reproductive success of the pair, relative to that of an established lone breeder, Models of reproductive skew 5 www.cambridge.org © in this web service Cambridge University Press Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-86409-1 -Reproductive Skew in Vertebrates: Proximate and Ultimate Causes Edited by Reinmar Hager and Clara B. Jones Excerpt More information is given by the parameter k (typically > 1). The expected reproductive success of an individual that disperses to breed elsewhere, again relative to that of an established lone breeder, is given by the parameter d (typically < 1, since we assume that dispersal entails some risk or cost). In a stable association, each individual must obtain sufficient reproductive success within the group that it would not gain either by leaving or by evicting the other (where eviction is possible).
In the concession model, one "dominant" individual is assumed to have complete control over the distribution of reproduction within the group, subject only to the threat of departure by the "subordinate." In this case, the subordinate in a stable group is expected to receive the minimum share of reproduction, p min , that is compatible with group stability, i.e. a share that is just sufficient to ensure that leaving is not profitable. This share is given by
where the first term on the left-hand side represents the direct fitness impact of staying (rather than leaving) on the subordinate, and the second term the indirect fitness impact on the reproductive success of the dominant. Rearranging, we obtain
, then the subordinate does best to remain even if the dominant completely monopolizes reproduction). In the restraint model, by contrast, the "subordinate" is free to claim unsanctioned reproduction, subject only to the threat of eviction by the "dominant". In this case, the dominant is expected to receive the minimum share of reproduction, q min , that is compatible with group stability, i.e. a share that is just sufficient to ensure that evicting the subordinate is not profitable. This share is given by
where the first term on the left-hand side represents the direct fitness impact of tolerating the subordinate's presence (rather than evicting it from the group) on the dominant, and the second term the indirect fitness impact of toleration on the reproductive success of the subordinate. Rearranging, we obtain 
In both models, the association will prove stable provided that p min þ q min < 1 ð1:5Þ
i.e. provided that the pair are together sufficiently productive that both may simultaneously receive at least their minimum required share. Substituting Equations 1.2 and 1.4 into 1.5, this yields the condition
implying that the association will prove stable provided that the total productivity of both individuals would be reduced if it were to break up.
Concessions and restraint
From Equations 1.2 and 1.6, we see that in the concession model the subordinate's share of reproduction in a stable group increases with the opportunity for independent breeding (d), but decreases with the productivity of the group (k) and the degree of relatedness between the players (r). This makes intuitive sense -when there are greater benefits to be obtained elsewhere, the subordinate must receive a greater share of group productivity to make staying worthwhile; at the same time, the greater the productivity of the group, and the greater the relatedness between the players, the smaller the share required to satisfy this requirement. From Equations 1.4 and 1.6, however, we see that in the restraint model, the dominant's share exhibits precisely the same trends (with the exception that it decreases with the opportunity for independent breeding only for r > 0). Consequently, the two models generally yield opposite predictions regarding skew. For instance, when group productivity increases, the concession model predicts a decrease in the subordinate's share, leading to greater skew (provided that the dominant enjoys greater reproductive success than the subordinate). By contrast, the restraint model predicts a decrease in the dominant's share, leading to reduced skew (again provided that the dominant enjoys greater reproductive success than the subordinate).
The difference between the two models lies in the roles assigned to the two individuals. In the concession model, it is the subordinate that threatens to break up the group, and the dominant that must concede reproduction it could otherwise claim in order to maintain the association; in the terminology of Buston et al. (2007) it is the dominant that allocates reproduction to its partner. By contrast, in the restraint model it is the dominant that threatens to break up the group, and the subordinate that must concede reproduction; in this case it is the subordinate that is the allocator. The terms Models of reproductive skew 7 www.cambridge.org © in this web service Cambridge University Press Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-86409-1 -Reproductive Skew in Vertebrates: Proximate and Ultimate Causes Edited by Reinmar Hager and Clara B. Jones Excerpt More information "dominant" and "subordinate" thus carry different meanings in the two models. In the concession model, dominance denotes control over the division of reproduction (subject to the threat of departure by the subordinate), while in the restraint model, dominance denotes control over group membership (i.e. the power to evict).
Compromise models
The concession and restraint models yield opposing predictions about skew, but both are instances of the transactional approach. In both, one individual is assumed to exercise full control over the division of reproduction, subject only to the threat of group breakup (which may be initiated by the other individual). Compromise models instead assume that each member of the group can act selfishly to claim a greater share of breeding opportunities, at a cost to the productivity of the group as a whole (Clutton-Brock 1998 , Reeve et al. 1998 , Johnstone 2000 . The outcome of the conflict over reproduction depends upon the level of selfish effort invested by each individual, and on their relative "strength." In this kind of model, "dominance" typically takes the form of greater competitive ability -the dominant individual may be able to invest more effort in competition than can subordinates, or it may obtain a greater share for the same level of investment, due to superior resource-holding potential (Reeve et al. 1998) . The other factor that can affect the outcome of the conflict in these models is relatedness among group members, which potentially influences the level of competitive effort that each individual will invest at equilibrium.
The most influential compromise model, the tug-of-war game of Reeve et al. (1998) , focuses (like the simple transactional models described above) on the interaction between two individuals, one dominant and one subordinate, who are related by a coefficient r. Both players simultaneously choose how much effort to invest in selfish competition over reproductive opportunities within the group. The levels of effort will be denoted x for the dominant and y for the subordinate. Total group productivity is equal to k(1ÀxÀy), where the parameter k specifies group productivity relative to that of a lone breeder in the absence of competition. Productivity thus declines linearly with total expenditure by both players on selfish competition. The fraction of reproduction claimed by the dominant is equal to x/(x þ by), where the parameter b (<1) specifies the competitive ability of the subordinate relative to that of the dominant. Dominance in this context is thus defined by superior competitive ability. Given the above assumptions, the direct fitness payoffs to the two players from the tug-of-war are given by
Reeve et al. (1998) derived the (unique) stable pair of effort levels x* and y* in the basic tug-of-war game, each of which simultaneously maximizes (for the player in question, given the other's behavior) the sum of its own direct fitness payoff plus r times that of the other player. These effort levels satisfy the first-order condition
and are given by The share of reproduction obtained by the subordinate at this equilibrium increases with its relative competitive ability, b, but surprisingly it is largely insensitive to the relatedness between the competitors, r. As relatedness increases, both players reduce their competitive effort, with the result that skew changes little.
Outside options
Much recent discussion of reproductive skew has focused on the issue of control. Can the dominant really prevent subordinates from claiming any share of reproduction, as concession models assume? Or are subordinates able to gain some reproductive success even against the best interests of the dominant, as in compromise models?
Can subordinates even claim a large enough share that the threat of eviction becomes relevant? Framed in these terms, compromise and transactional approaches start to seem less clearly distinct. Perhaps concession and restraint models simply represent extreme cases on a continuum of Models of reproductive skew 9 www.cambridge.org © in this web service Cambridge University Press Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-86409-1 -Reproductive Skew in Vertebrates: Proximate and Ultimate Causes Edited by Reinmar Hager and Clara B. Jones Excerpt More information dominant control -the former deal with cases in which the dominant has full control over reproduction, the latter with cases in which the dominant has none (except that granted by the threat of eviction).
There remains, however, another fundamental difference between transactional and compromise models. The transactional models incorporate outside options -the possibility of leaving to breed elsewhere, or of evicting a competitor from the group. Indeed, it is these outside options that, in transactional analyses, set limits on the level of skew possible in a stable group. The fitness prospects of individuals that leave or are forced out of a group, usually referred to in terms of ecological constraints, thus have a major influence on skew in transactional analyses. By contrast, compromise models have generally ignored outside options, and focus only on the resolution of conflict within the group. Ecological constraints thus have no influence on the outcome of these analyses.
In reality, it seems likely that animals will often have the opportunity to leave a group and breed elsewhere, or to evict others from the association. But at the same time, it also seems likely that no one individual will enjoy complete control over reproduction within the group. A realistic model of skew, therefore, needs to incorporate both competition over reproduction within the group, as in compromise models, and outside options, as in transactional models. How are these two approaches to be combined? While there have been several attempts to "synthesize" skew models in order to answer this question, there is still little agreement over which approach is appropriate ( Johnstone 2000 , Reeve & Shen 2006 , Nonacs 2007 .
Synthetic models
In a previous review paper (Johnstone 2000), one of us outlined a synthetic model of skew that attempted to incorporate outside options into the tug-of-war model of Reeve et al. (1998) . In this combined model, animals were assumed first to yield concessions to one another, in the form of uncontested shares of group productivity, sufficient to ensure that neither would benefit by leaving the group. Subsequently, both were assumed to engage in a tug-of-war competition over the remaining, contested fraction of reproduction. The model suffers from a problem, however, in that the concessions required to prevent departure in the first step are calculated on the basis of total group productivity, overlooking the fact that some of this productivity will be squandered in competition during the second step. Because of the costs of competition, the original concessions lose some of their value, and can no longer be relied upon to ensure group stability when the outcome of the tug-ofwar is taken into account.
